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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - IGNORANCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION -
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM ACCRUES WHEN PLAINTIFF
DISCOVERS DEFENDANT'S POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE
In 1975 Dr. Lester D. Shook treated Louise Anderson with
external radiation therapy for cancer of the uterus.' In July 1976
Mrs. Anderson knew she had been permanently injured as a result
of the radiation therapy administered by Dr. Shook.2 In 1980 Mrs.
Anderson discovered that the radiation treatments given by Dr.
Shook in 1975 may have been negligently administered.3 In
September 1981 Anderson brought actions against Dr. Shook and
Radiologists, Ltd., alleging negligence.4 Shook contended that the
action was barred by the North Dakota statute of limitations, which
provides that medical malpractice actions must be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrued.5 The trial
1. Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 709 (N.D. 1983). A Colorado physician referred Mrs.
Anderson to the Dakota Hospital in Fargo in 1975 where Dr. Blaine Amidon treated her with in-
ternal radium treatments. Id. Dr. Amidon referred her to Dr. Shook, an employee of Radiologists,
Ltd., who treated her during September and October of 1975. Id.
2. Id. The plaintiff and defendant agreed that Mrs. Anderson was injured by radiation therapy.
Id.
3. Id. In December 1979 a friend of Mrs. Anderson underwent radiation treatment for cancer
of the uterus. Record at 54, Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983). Her physicians told
her that there is no excuse for radiation burns if the radiation therapy is properly administered. Id.
This information was communicated to Mrs. Anderson shortly thereafter. Id.
4. 333 N.W.2d at 709. Anderson alleged that Dr. Shook negligently administered the radiation
therapy, which resulted in permanent injury. Id.
5. Id. The North Dakota statute of limitations provision reads in relevant part as follows:
The following actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action
has accrued:
(3) An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice; provided,
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court granted Dr. Shook's motion for dismissal because more than
two years had passed since Mrs. Anderson knew of the injury and
the cause of that injury. 6 The issue before the North Dakota
Supreme Court was whether the knowledge required by a plaintiff
in a medical malpractice case, which would cause an action to
accrue under the statute of limitations, included knowledge that the
cause of the injury may have been medical malpractice.' The court
held that the action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or with
reasonable diligence should have known, of the injury, its cause,
and the defendant's possible negligence. 8 Anderson v. Shook, 333
N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983).
Statutes of limitation are characteristically based on the
proposition that persons who sleep on their right to commence a
cause of action may lose that right after a specified period of time. 9
Thus, a statute of limitations can effectively deprive a person of the
opportunity to pursue an otherwise valid claim. 10 The common law
imposed no limit on the time in which an action must be brought.I
Therefore, any time limitation placed on an action is the result of
statutory enactment. 12
The primary purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect the
however, that the limitation of an action against a physician or a licensed
hospital will not be extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged
malpractice by a nondiscovery thereof unless discovery was prevented by the
fraudulent conduct of the physician or licensed hospital....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1983).
6. 333 N.W.2d at 709. The trial court found that whether or not the action was barred by the
statute of limitations depended upon the court's interpretation of the meaning of "discovery," which
was a question of law. Record at 55. The trial court found that the parties did not dispute the
pertinent facts regarding the dates of'Mrs. Anderson's discovery. Id.
The trial court divided the plaintiff's knowledge into three elements: (1) knowledge that she has
iniuries: (2) knowledge of the causal relationship between the injuries and the medical treatment;
and (3) knowledge that the medical treatment might have constituted malpractice. Id. at 56. The
trial court found that the third element was unnecessary to constitute discovery under the statute of
limitations. Id.
7. 333 N.W.2d at 709-10.
8. Id. at 712. The court in Anderson also held that the period for bringing an action will not be
extended beyond six years of the alleged malpractice. Id. The court further held that whether Mrs.
Anderson had or should have had knowledge of Dr. Shook's alleged negligence was a genuine issue
of fact that prevented the court from granting a motion for summary judgment. Id.
9. Order of R.R.Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
In Railway Express the United States Supreme Court determined that the statute of limitations did not
bar a wage claim that was commenced in a timely manner but not filed until seven years later. Id.
The Court found that the justification for a statute of limitations is the right of a defendant to be free
of stale claims even if those claims arejust. Id.
10. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1944). The Court in Donaldson noted
that some jurisdictions view statutes of limitation as extinguishing the claim and destroying the right
to bring an action, while others view statutes of limitation as doing no more than cutting off resort to
the courts for enforcement of the claim: Id.
11. Note, Tort Law - Federal Tort Claims Act -Accrual ofMedical Malpractice Action - United States
v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 158 (1981) (citing H. WOOD,
LIMITATION OF ACTION 4 (2d ed. 1893)). The commentator traces the historical development ot
statutes of limitation from the common law to *the adoption of a discovery rule for medical
malpractice actions. Note, supra, at 157-60.
12. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 314.
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defendant from defending a claim after memories have faded,
witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. 3
Statutes of limitation are primarily designed to assure fairness to
the defendant. 14 They also relieve courts of the burden of trying
stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his right to bring an
action. 15
Statutes of limitation generally begin to run when a cause of
action accrues. 16 A cause of action originally was considered to
accrue at the time the defendant committed the tort although the
injured person had no knowledge or reason to know of the tort. 17 In
medical malpractice actions, there has been an extensive departure
from this rule. 8 Courts, recognizing that an injury may not
manifest itself until after the limitations period has expired, have
adopted a discovery rule to determine when a cause of action in
medical malpractice cases would accrue. 19
In general, a discovery rule provides that a cause of action for
medical malpractice will not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered the injury. A majority of jurisdictions have
adopted some form of the discovery rule by court decision or
statute.20
13. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. at 349. See United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (purpose of a statute of limitations is to encourage the
nromnt nresentment of claims).
14. Burnett v. New York Cent. R. R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (applying a federal statute of
limitations).
15. Id.
16. Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (1950). A
typical statute of limitations provides that the period within which an action may be brought is to be
computed from the time the "cause of action accrues." Id. Legislatures have adopted a concept
delineating the combination of facts or events that create a cause of action. The occurrence of the last
of these requisite facts is, therefore, the point at which the cause of action accrues. Id.
17. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 899 comment e (1979).
18. Id.- Comment e of the Restatement explains the departure from the traditional rule
concerning when a cause of action accrues as follows:
Two reasons can be suggested as to why there has been a change in the rule in many
jurisdictions in [the area of medical malpractice]. One is the fact that in most instances
the statutory period within which the action must be initiated is short - one year, or
at most two, being the common time limit. This is for the purpose of protecting
physicians against unjustified claims; but since many of the consequences of medical
malpractice often do not become known or apparent for a period longer than that of
the statute, the injured plaintiff is left without a remedy. The second reason is that the
nature of the tort itself and the character of the injury will frequently prevent
knowledge of what is wrong, so that plaintiff is forced to rely upon what he is told by
the physician or surgeon.
Id.
19. See, e.g., Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, __, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967) (to bar
plaintiff's action before he is aware that he has a claim is patent injustice); Myrick v.James 444 A.2d
987, 994 (Me. 1982) (manifest injustice to bar plaintiff's claim because he is unaware of medical
malpractice until after limitations period); Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, __ , 411 N.E.2d 458,
463 (1980) (unjust to punish "blameless ignorance" by holding a medical malpractice action time-
barred before the plaintiff reasonably could have known he has suffered a harm). See generally Annot.
80 A. L.R. 3D 368, 387-400 (1961) (discussion of various approaches to adopting discovery rule).
20. The following jurisdictions have adopted a discovery rule for medical malpractice actions:
Alabama (see ALA. CODE S 6-5-482 (1975)); Arizona (see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 12-564 (1976));
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The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the discovery rule
in Iverson v. Lancaster.21 In Iverson the court was faced with the task of
determining when the limitations period of a statute of limitations
started to run. 22 Dr. Lancaster, the defendant in Iverson, treated
Mrs. Iverson for high blood pressure from 1957 to 1962.23 Dr.
Lancaster advised Mrs. Iverson that because of her high blood
pressure she should not become pregnant. 24 In February 1959 Mrs.
Iverson underwent a hysterectomy. 25  In 1962 Dr. Lancaster
correctly diagnosed Mrs. Iverson's condition as coarctation of the
aorta and recommended corrective surgery, which eliminated
plaintiff's high blood pressure. 26 In 1964 Mrs. Iverson brought an
action against Dr. Lancaster claiming that Dr. Lancaster was
negligent and the hysterecotmy was unnecessary.2 7 The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint after the close of the plaintiff's
Arkansas (see ARK. STAT. ANN. S 34-2616 (Cum. Supp. 1983)); California (see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
S 340.5 (West 1975)); Colorado (see COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-80-105 (1973)); Connecticut (see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp. 1983)); Delaware (see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, S 6856 (Cum.
Supp. 1982)); District of Columbia (seeJones v. Rogers Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir.
1971)); Florida (see FLA. STAT. ANN. S 95.11 (4) (b) (West 1982)); Georgia (see GA. CODE ANN. SS 3-
1102-1103 (Gum. Supp. 1982)); Hawaii (see HAWAII REV. STAT. S 657-7.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982));,
Idaho (see IDAHO CODE S 5-219 (4) (1979)); Illinois (see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 113-212 (Smith-Hurd
1982)); Iowa (see IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (9) (West 1983)); Kansas (see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513
(1976)); Kentucky (see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140 (2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982)); Louisiana
(see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 9, § 5628 (West 1983)); Maine (see Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987
(Me. 1982)); Maryland (see MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1980)); Masachusetts (see
Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980)); Michigan (see MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
S 600.5838 (Cum. Supp. 1983)); Mississippi (see Miss. CODE ANN. S 15-1-36 (Supp. 1983)); Missouri
(see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); Montana (see MONT. CODE ANN. 5 27-2-205
(1983)); Nebraska (see NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1978)); Nevada (see NEV. REV. STAT. S 41 A.097
(1981)); New Hampshire (see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 507-C:4 (1983)); New Jersey (see Lopez v.
Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971.); New York (see N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 214:6 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1983)); North Carolina (see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (c)
1983)); North Dakota (see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (3) (Cum. Supp. 1983)); Ohio (see OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (B) (Page Cum. Supp. 1983)); Oklahoma (see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76,
§18 (West Cum. Supp. 1983)); Oregon (see OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110 (4) (1981)); Pennsylvania (see
Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959)); Rhode Island (see R.I. GEN. LAWS S 9-1-14.1
(Supp. 1983)); South Carolina (see S.C. CODE ANN. S 15-3-545 (Law. Co-op Gum. Supp. 1982));
Tennessee (see TENN. CODE ANN. S 29-26-116 (1980)); Utah (see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (1977));
Vermont (see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 521 (Supp. 1983)); Virginia (see Dessi v. United States, 489 F.
Supp. 722 (E.D. Va. 1980) (applying Virginia law)); Washington (see WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
4.16.350 (Cum. Supp. 1983)); West Virginia (see W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1981)); Wisconsin (see
WIS. STAT. ANN. S 893.55 (1983)); Wyoming (see Wyo. STAT. S 1-3-107 (1977)).
21. 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968).
22. Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D. 1968). At the time Iverson was decided,
the North Dakota statute of limitations provided, "the following actions must be commenced within
two years after the cause of action has accrued.. .(3) An action for the recovery of damages resulting
from malpractice .... " N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-18 (1974).
23. 158 N.W.2d at 509. Dr. Lancaster first saw Mrs. Iverson in July 1957. He diagnosed her
condition as hypertension, commonly known as high blood pressure. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Dr. Lancaster recommended that Mrs. Iverson have a tuboligation. Id. On February 27,
1959, Dr. Darner performed a hysterectomy on Mrs. Iverson. Id.
26. Id. Mrs. Iverson continued to see Dr. Lancaster for the treatment of high blood pressure
from 1957 until June 27, 1962. Id. At that time Dr. Lancaster examined Mrs. Iverson further and
discovered she had coarctation of the aorta. Id. Corrective surgery was performed onJuly 5, 1962 at
the Minnesota Heart Hospital. Id.
27. Id. In Iverson the plaintiff brought the medical malpractice action more than two years after
the hysterectomy was performed but less than two years after the diagnosis of coarctation of the aorta
was made by the defendant, Dr. Lancaster. Id. at 508.
298
CASE COMMENTS
evidence. 28 The supreme court reversed, holding that the action
accrued at the time Mrs. Iverson's condition was correctly
diagnosed because that is when she first could have discovered that
the hysterectomy was unnecessary. 2 9 The court discussed the
adoption of the discovery rule by various jurisdictions and decided
to adopt the rule in North Dakota.3 0 Since the Iverson decision, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has not made any alterations in the
discovery rule although it has refused to extend the rule to wrongful
death actions involving medical malpractice. 31
In 1975 the North Dakota Legislature amended section 28-01-
18 (3) of the North Dakota Century Code to embody the discovery
rule and to provide a maximum time limit of six years from the date
of the act or omission in which a plaintiff can bring an action for
medical malpractice. 32 This amendment balances the need to allow
plaintiffs access to the courts with the need to protect defendants
from stale claims. 33 The amendment also provides for an absolute
cutoff date on which medical malpractice insurance rates can be
based.
In most medical malpractice cases, the discovery of the injury
and its cause indicates that the professional has breached a legal
duty. 34 When the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the
discovery rule in Iverson, it did not clearly define the degree of
knowledge necessary to show discovery of a cause of action for
medical malpractice. 35 The 1975 amendment to section 28-01-18
(3) of the North Dakota Century Code did not remove this
ambiguity.3 6 Thus, when faced with the fact situation in Anderson,
28. Id. at 509. Before the trial in Iverson, Dr. Lancaster moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The trial court denied
this motion without explanation. Id. When the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a
dismissal with prejudice or, in the alternative, for a directed verdict. Id. The trial court granted the
motion for dismissal. Id.
29. Id. at 512.
30. Id. at 510-11. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Iverson stated, "We conclude that the
best rule is that the limitation period commences to run against a malpractice action from the time
the act of malpractice with resulting injury is, or by reasonable diligence could be, discovered." Id.
at 510.
31. See Krueger v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 305 N.W.2d 18, 23 (N.D. 1981) (the discovery rule does
not apply to wrongful death actions because the fact of death itself should indicate a starting point for
inquiry regarding a cause of action for wrongful death); Hubbard v. Libi, 229 N.W.2d 82, 83 (N.D.
1975) (the discovery rule may not be extended to wrongful death actions).
32. See supra note 5 for the current version of § 28-01-18 (3) of the North Dakota Century Code.
33. See Sonenshein, A Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice. Massachusetts Joins the Fold, 3 W. NEw
ENG. L. Rev. 433, 444 (1981). The commentator notes that plaintiffs benefit from a discovery rule
with a lengthy outer limit because symptoms, in most cases, will appear by the time the outer limit is
reached. Id.
34. 333 N.W.2d at 710. See generally Note, supra note 11 (discusses the discovery rule in cases
litigated under the Federal Torts Claims Act).
35. 333 N.W.2d at 710. In Iverson the court determined that the limitations period begins to run
in a malpractice action from the time the act of malpractice was, or should have been, discovered. Id.
36. Id. at 709-10. For the text of § 28-01-18(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra
note 5.
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the supreme court found it necessary to determine what knowledge
constituted discovery of a plaintiff's cause of action. 37 In making
this determination, the court looked to other jurisdictions that had
litigated this specific issue. 38
The trial court, in granting the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment in Anderson v. Shook, relied on the 1979 United
States Supreme Court case of United States v. Kubrick. 39 The Court
in Kubrick was faced with a fact pattern analagous to Anderson. In
1969 Kubrick knew he had a hearing loss and that it was highly
possible that the cause of the loss was an antibiotic drug given to
him by his physician in 1968.40 It was not until 1971 that another
physician told Kubrick that the drug which caused his hearing loss
never should have been given to him. 41 In 1972 Kubrick filed an ac-
tion under the Federal Torts Claims Act. 42 After reviewing the
various policy arguments and the intent of Congress in enacting the
Act, the Supreme Court held that the cause of action accrued in
1969 when Kubrick knew of his injury and its cause, rather than
when he discovered the doctor's potential negligence. 43 Justice
White pointed out that a plaintiff, armed with the facts about harm
done to him, can protect himself by seeking advice in the medical
and legal community.44 After reviewing the Kubrick decision, the
Anderson court looked to other jurisdictions that have rejected the
Kubrick holding.4 5 One jurisdiction is Hawaii, where the appellate
court specifically rejected the Kubrick position in Jacoby v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospital.4 6 The court inJacoby held that the Hawaii two-
37. 333 N.W.2d at 709. The plaintiff in Anderson did not discover that it was reasonably probable
her injury was caused by negligent treatment until four years after she knew she was injured. Id.
38. Id. at 710-11. The court found that relatively few jurisdictions had litigated actions of such
medical complexity in which a reasonably diligent plaintiff knows of his injury and its causes but has
no reason to suspect malpractice. Id. at 710.
39. Id. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
40. 444 U.S. at 113-14. In April 1968 Kubrick was treated at the Pennsylvania Veterans
Administration Hospital for an infection of the right femur. Id. at 113. An antibiotic, neomycin, was
used to irrigate the infected area. Id. Approximately six weeks later, Kubrick noticed some hearing
loss. Id. at 113-14. In January 1969 another physician informed Kubrick that it was highly
possible that the hearing loss was the result of the neomycin treatment. Id. at 114.
41. Id. at 114. In Kubrick the plaintiff made a claim for disability benefits afterjanuary 1969. Id.
In the course of appealing the denial of his claim for benefits, Kubrick was told on June 2, 1971 that
the neomycin, which caused his injury, should never have been administered. Id.
42. Id. at 115. The Federal Torts Claims Act provides that the United States shall be liable to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances in tort actions. See 28 U.S.C. S 2674
(1976).
43. 444 U.S. at 123-24. The Court in Kubrick saw no reason to suppose that competent advice
would not be available to the plaintiff concerni ng whether his treatment confiormied to the generally
applicable community standard of care. Id. The Court imposed on the plaintiff the duty to seek that
advice and determine whether or not to sue. Id. at 124.
44. Id. at 123.
45. 333 N.W.2d at 710.
46. 622 P.2d 613 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). InJacoby the plaintiff was treated in September of
1972. The treatment did not eliminate her physical problems. Jacoby v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 622
300 [VOL. 60:295
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year statute of limitations commenced to run when the plaintiff
discovered or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have
discovered (1) the damage; (2) the violation of the duty; and (3) the
casual connection between the violation of the duty and the
damage. 47 TheJacoby court found that the six-year maximum time
limit for medical malpractice claims distinguished the case from
Kubrick.48
In Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co. 49 the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia also rejected the Kubrick position in favor of
the Hawaii position. 50 The court held that when the plaintiff has
knowledge of the injury and causation, but no knowledge of any
wrongdoing, the action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or by
due diligence should discover, the wrongdoing. 5' The district court
in Dawson reviewed the two positions with respect to discovery of
potential negligence as an event to cause an action to accrue. 52 The
Dawson court reiterated that the purpose of a discovery rule is to
give a plaintiff an opportunity to bring an action when he realizes
he may have a claim against a negligent physician.5 3 The court
reasoned that its position best accommodates assumptions made by
plaintiffs cannot be expected to assume a doctor has been negligent
when an injury is discovered. 54 As the Anderson court noted, other
P,2d 613, 614 (Hawaii Ct, App. 1981). In 1974 the plaintiffwas treated by a different physician who
indicated that her problems could have been caused by prior treatment. Id. at 614-15. In 1974
plaintiff filed a claim with the Peer Review Committee of the Honolulu Medical Society. The claim
was denied. Id. at 615. In 1976 another physician told plaintiff that the treatment rendered in 1972
may have been negligent. Id. at 618. Plaintiff brought suit in 1976. Id. at 615.
47. Id. at 617.
48. Id. The court noted that Justice White, in Kubrick, was concerned that plaintiffs would not
make prompt inquiry into their potential claims if the statute of limitations did not accrue until
negligence was discovered. Id. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 118. The court then pointed out that Hawaii's
six-year limit on actions eliminated this concern. 622 P.2d at 617. Cf Yamaguchi v. Queen's
Medical Center,__ Hawaii -, 648 P.2d 689 (1982) (allowing a claim for injuries resulting from
radiation treatment administered in 1949 to be commenced in 1976 because plaintiffdid not discover
consequences of treatment until 1975).
49. 543 F.Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1982).
50. Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F.Supp. 1330, 1330 (D.D.C. 1982). Dawson involved a
products liability suit brought by the daughter of a woman who took diethylstilbestrol (DES) during
her pregnancy. Id. at 1331. The plaintiff was diagnosed as having cervical adenosis in 1973 when she
was seventeen years old. Id. at 1331-32. She brought the lawsuit against the manufacturers of DES in
1981. Id. at 1332. The defendants claimed that the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's claim
expired in 1979. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
1980 when she discovered that DES was not adequately tested for safety before marketing. Id.
51. Id. at 1338. The court in Dawson pointed out that its holding did not mean that a plaintiff has
to be aware of all the elements of a legal action, the probability of success of a lawsuit, or that the
knowledge of wrongdoing is a certainty. The plaintiff merely has to have some awareness, or
imputed awareness, that the injuries were the result of some wrongdoing on the part of the
defendant. Id. at 1339.
52. Id. at 1334-37. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two
positions regarding the accrual of a medical malpractice action.
53. 543 F. Supp. at 1337-38. The court in Dawson stated that "discovery rules are adopted to
avoid the unfairness of interpreting a statute of limitations to accrue when the injury first occurs, if at
that time plaintiffdoes not have enough information to bring suit. " Id. at 1338.
302 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:295
jurisdictions have adopted positions similar toJacoby and Dawson by
including knowledge of possible negligence as a factor that
determines when a statute of limitations begins to run. 
55
In Anderson the doctor urged the North Dakota Supreme Court
to adopt the Kubrick position and rule that the claim
was barred by the statute of limitations, which began to run when
plaintiff discovered her injury and its cause.5 6 The plaintiff argued
that the action accrued when she discovered her injury, its cause,
and the reasonable probability that the treatment was negligent. 57
The Anderson court recognized that the policy of a statute of
limitations is to discourage unfounded claims. 58 The court felt that
the Kubrick position, contrary to public policy, would encourage
anyone who had an injury to file a lawsuit against a physician or
hospital to prevent the statute of limitations from running. 59 The
court recognized the need for injured parties to be given the
opportunity to seek relief in the courts and the competing need for
defendants to be given eventual repose. 60
The court in Anderson also noted that one of Justice White's
concerns in Kubrick was that a plaintiff who could wait until the
discovery of negligence to bring a claim would be free to sue at any
time within two years of when he formed an opinion for himself
that he had been wronged. 61 The court found that this problem did
not exist in North Dakota because the statute provides for a six-
54. Id. at 1337. The court stated that a person who has been injured cannot be expected to know
that wrongful conduct is involved. An injured person might assume that the result suffered is
considered acceptable by medical standards or that it is simply an unforeseeable consequence beyond
anyone's control. Id.
55. The following jurisdictions consider knowledge of possible negligence a factor that
determines when a statute of limitations begins to run: Arizona (see Mayer v. Good Samaritan
Hosp., 14 Ariz. App. 248, __, 482 P.2d 497, 501 (1971)); Illinois (see Witherall v. Weimer, 85
11.2d 146, __, 421 N.E.2d 869, 874 (1981)); Iowa (see Baines v. Blenderman, 2 2 3 N.W.2d 199. 201
(Iowa 1974)); Louisiana (see Cordova v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 387 So.2d 574, 577 (La.
1980)); Michigan (see Leary v. Rupp, 89 Mich. App. 145, -, 280 N.W.2d 466, 468 (1979)); New
Hampshire (see Brown v. Mary Hitchock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, -, 378 A.2d 1138,
1140 (1977)); NewJersey (see Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, -. , 424 A.2d 1169, 1173 (1981));
Oregon (see Hoffman v. Rockey, 550 Or. App. 658, -, 639 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1982)); Utah (see
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979)); West Virginia (see Harrison v. Seltzer, 149 W.Va.
783, -, 268 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1980)).
56. 333 N.W.2d at 710. In Anderson Dr. Shook contended that because the plaintiffknew as early
as July 1976 that the radiation treatments caused her injuries, the statute of limitations expired
inJuly 1978. Id. at 709-10.
57. Id. at 709. Mrs. Anderson contended that it was not until 1980 that she discovered that Dr.
Shook's treatment could have been negligent, and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until that time. Id.
58. Id. at 710.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 712. The court in Anderson stated, "Statutes of limitation inherently involve a
balancing of interests. On the one hand, parties injured by the action of others must be given an
opportunity to seek relief in the courts. On the other hand, potential defendants are entitled to
eventual repose." Id.
61. Id. at 710.
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year maximum time limit that fulfills the defendant's need for
eventual repose. 62
The Anderson court next addressed Justice White's second
accrue at the time the plaintiff discovered the injury and its
causation. 63 The Anderson court found that the language of the
statute and the decision in Iverson adequately covered the plaintiff's
duty of reasonable diligent inquiry, which troubled justice White. 64
Finally, the Anderson court reasoned that policies allowing a plaintiff
to bring a claim after acquiring knowledge of possible negligence
outweighed the policies that would bar the claim. 65
Once the court reached that conclusion, it found that a
genuine issue of material fact existed, which prevented the trial
court from granting summary judgment. 66 The supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Mrs.
Anderson should have known of the alleged negligence prior to
1980.67
The Anderson decision expanded the discovery rule in
North Dakota to allow a plaintiff to bring a claim within two years
after three factors are discovered: knowledge of injury, causation,
and negligence. 68 The court did not specify what will constitute
discovery but made this a question of fact, which the plaintiff must
prove. 69
After the Anderson decision, claims for medical malpractice
may require a separate determination concerning when the statute
of limitations begins to run for an individual plaintiff. The plaintiff
will be required to present evidence showing when he discovered
the injury, its cause, and the alleged breach of duty by the
physician or hospital. As the Anderson court pointed out, in most
medical malpractice cases the discovery of the injury and its cause
62. Id. at 712. The court pointed out that the six-year maximum time limit protected defendants
from plaintiffs who might feel free to sue at any time after discovering the potential negligence. Id.
63. Id. at 710.
64. Id. at 711.
65. Id. at 712. The court stated:
[P]olicies allowing a plaintiff to bring an action when she has knowledge of her injury,
its cause, and the possible negligence of the physician or hospital outweigh those
policies which would bar a consideration of the merits of an action brought within the
six-year period from the time of the alleged negligent act or omission.
Id.
66. Id. The court noted that summary judgment is not appropriate if reasonable differences of
opinion exist concerning inferences that can be drawn from undisputed facts. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citingJohnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 540 (N.D. 1981)).
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will occur simultaneously with the discovery of an alleged breach of
duty. 70 At that point the two-year statute of limitations would begin
to run. 71 The Anderson decision will provide for those cases in which
this type of discovery does not occur.
JEAN P. HANNIG
70. 333 N.W.2d at 710.
71. Id.
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